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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

KENNETH GLENN ROBERTS,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 910164

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated assault
by a prisoner, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-103.5 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1991),
because the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case
involving a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court deprive defendant of a due

process right to present his defense when it ruled as a matter of
law that the defense of compulsion was not available to him?
Because the court ruled as a matter of law that the evidence was
insufficient to allow evidence of the defense, the issue is a
legal conclusion and reviewed for correction of error.

State v.

Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 1989).
2.

Did the trial court correctly determine that the

defense of compulsion was not available to defendant in this case

as a matter of law?

This issue is a legal conclusion which is

reviewed for correction of error, but any subsidiary factual
determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah April 23,
1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies are included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 30, 1990, defendant was charged with
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990); and aggravated assault by a
prisoner, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-5-103.5 (1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 6-8).
Trial was set originally for November 26, 1990, in the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Scott Daniels, judge, presiding (R. at 18). On November 30,
1990, trial was re-scheduled for January 22, 1991 (R. at 19). On
January 9, 1991, defendant filed a subpoena for the director of
the Utah State Department of Corrections (R. at 20). Five days
later, counsel for the director filed a motion to quash the
subpoena on the bases of improper service and unreasonableness
(R. at 22-32).

Also on January 14, 1991, defendant filed

subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum for eight other individuals
involved in the Department of Corrections (R. at 33-40).

At a

hearing conducted on January 17, 1991, Judge Daniels granted a
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motion to quash all of the subpoenas and granted defendant's
motion to continue the trial (R. at 41).

The court also ruled

that the evidence and witnesses sought by defendant through these
subpoenas were irrelevant to defendant's case and that the
defense of compulsion was not available as a matter of law in
defendant's factual circumstance (Transcript of hearing 1/17/91
[hereafter T.] at 19-20; a copy of the transcript is attached as
the Addendum).

On March 8, 1991, defendant entered a guilty plea

to aggravated assault by a prisoner, conditioned on taking this
appeal of the court's prior ruling (R. at 80 and transcript of
hearing 3/8/91 at 3-4). Defendant was immediately sentenced to a
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison, to be served
concurrently with the sentences he was already serving (R* at
88).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts pertinent to this matter are contained in the
Statement of the Case and the body of the brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's right to present his defense is not an
absolute right.

If he has not proffered or presented sufficient

evidence of the elements of the defense to raise it, the trial
court may, as a matter of law, preclude defendant from presenting
the defense.
The evidence proffered by defendant did not meet the
elements of the defense of compulsion; consequently, the defense
was not available to defendant.
•3-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF
ANY DUE PROCESS RIGHT BY RULING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENSE OF COMPULSION WAS NOT
AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANT•
Defendant first claims that he was deprived of a due
process right to present his defense when the court determined as
a matter of law that the defense of compulsion was not available
to defendant in this factual circumstance.

"Under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal prosecutions
must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. We
have long interpreted this standard of fairness to require that
criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.'1

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.

479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984).

This right was recognized

by this Court in State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981), when
it said:
[W]e start with the proposition that the
defendant's right to present all competent
evidence in his defense is a right guaranteed
by the due process clause of our State
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7, as well as our
Federal Constitution, 14th Amendment. It is
also axiomatic that where the defendant has
asserted a defense to justify or excuse the
criminal charge, and where there is
reasonable basis in the evidence to support
it, the viability of the defense then becomes
a question of fact and the jury should be
charged regarding it. Where, however, there
is no reasonable basis in the evidence to
support the defense or its essential
components, it is not error for the trial
judge to either refuse to instruct the jury
as to the defense, or to instruct them to
disregard it.
...
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The question for this Court to determine
is whether there was sufficient credible
evidence in support of the defense of
compulsion to justify instructing the jury
thereon.
Id, at 34 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

In State v.

Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), this Court also stated:
It is a basic legal premise that a
defendant in a criminal case is entitled to
have his theory of the case presented to the
jury. However, the right is not absolute,
and a defense theory must be supported by a
certain quantum of evidence before [the jury
may be instructed on it].
Id, at 634 (footnotes omitted).

While recognizing a defendant's

right to present his defenses, this Court has also recognized
that the right is not absolute.

Defendant must proffer

sufficient credible evidence in support the defense to justify
the defense being presented to a jury,

Obversely, if he has not

proffered sufficient credible evidence to support the defense,
the trial court may properly preclude him from presenting that
defense.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a
similar situation, involving the defense of entrapment, in United
States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1986).

Ortiz had

sought to assert the defense at trial but the district court did
not allow him to because there was no evidence to support the
defense. JTd. at 1163.

The circuit court said:

It is well established that a defendant is
entitled to have a jury consider any defense
which is supported by the law and has
sufficient foundation in the evidence to
create a genuine issue of fact. . . . This
right is so important that the failure to
-5-

allow a defendant to present a theory of
defense which is supported by sufficient
evidence is reversible error. • . . Evidence
is sufficient to put a theory of defense
before a jury if it creates a genuine factual
dispute. When the evidence presents no
genuine dispute, there* is no factual issue
for the jury, and the district court has a
duty to rule on the defense as a matter of
law. • • •
Just as a court may find entrapment "as a
matter of law" when the evidence satisfying
the elements of entrapment is uncontradicted,
it also may conclude "as a matter of law"
that the evidence is insufficient to create a
triable issue. Thus, whether there is
evidence sufficient to constitute a triable
issue of entrapment is a question of law.
Id. at 1163-64 (citations omitted).

See also United State v,

Campbell. 609 P.2d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 445
U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1282 (1980) ("If evidence is introduced, but
it is apparent that all of the requirements of the coercion
defense are not addressed, the trial court is not obligated to
allow the evidence to remain for consideration by the jury").
The right to present a specific defense is not
absolute.

If a defendant has not proffered or presented enough

evidence of the elements of the defense to even raise it, the
trial court has a duty to refuse to allow defendant to present
the defense.

As will be addressed in Point II, the trial court

correctly concluded that defendant had not proffered sufficient
evidence of the elements of the defense of compulsion to raise
the defense.
At the pretrial hearing on the motion to quash
subpoenas, the attorney for the subpoenaed witnesses argued that
the subpoenas had not been served properly because they were not
-6-

served personally and because they were not served timely (T. at
4 and 6-7). The trial court found that service had not been
properly done and quashed the subpoenas on that basis (T. at 1920),

After the attorney for the witnesses addressed the court,

the deputy county attorney argued that the testimony to be
provided by these witnesses was not relevant to the case (T. at
7-8).

In response to this argument, defendant proffered the

evidence which he intended to elicit from the witnesses in
support of his claimed defense of compulsion (T. at 13-16).

The

court required defendant to specifically address the question of
the relevance of each witness (T. at 16). Taking the witnesses
individually, defendant proffered what each would testify and the
relevance of that testimony to his claimed defense (T. at 16-18).
After hearing this proffer of the full testimony that defendant
expected from the witnesses, the trial court concluded that the
testimony would not support the claim of compulsion as a matter
of law and thus was irrelevant.

Because the evidence was

irrelevant, the court concluded that the evidence was not
admissible and defendant would not be allowed to put it on (T. at
20).

The trial court did not preclude defendant from presenting

a defense.

Based on defendant's proffer, the court determined

that the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible.

Defendant did

not seek to elaborate on his proffer or call the witnesses to
demonstrate that the evidence was relevant; instead, he pled
guilty and filed this appeal.

-7-

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE
DEFENSE OF COMPULSION DID NOT APPLY TO
DEFENDANT'S CASE.
Defendant's next claim is that the trial court
improperly concluded that defendant's proffered evidence was not
relevant and therefore, the defense of compulsion was not a
viable defense as a matter of law in this case (T. at 20).
The defense of compulsion (also known as duress) is
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (1990):
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct
because he was coerced to do so by the use or
threatened imminent use of unlawful physical
force upon him or a third person, which force
or threatened force a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would not have
resisted.
Utah courts have not addressed the defense of
compulsion in the context of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated
assault by a prisoner.

However, language from this Court and

from courts from other states in prison cases are helpful in
analyzing this claim.

In an escape case, this Court, in State v.

Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986), examined the defense of
compulsion under the common law and the Utah criminal code.
Although the legislature "abandoned" the common law when it
codified Utah criminal law, this Court considered itself "free to
refer to [the common law] for such interpretive assistance as it
may offer" when the differences between the common law and the
code were "largely technical."

JDd. at 633.

Finding the

differences between common law and the criminal code in the realm
•8-

of the defense of compulsion or duress to fall within this
category, this Court sought guidance in the common law for
analyzing the use of this defense.

This Court found no Utah

cases construing the defense in the context of an escape charge;
however, it approved the trial court's reliance on cases from
other jurisdictions in fashioning a jury instruction
incorporating this defense. ,Id. Specifically, this Court
approved the use of a test delineated in People v. Lovercamp, 43
Cal.App.3d 823, 118 Cal.Rptr. 110 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1974),
which "has been widely followed since it was published."
730 P.2d at 633.

Tuttle,

These other jurisdictions had, like Utah, found

"that their statutes were inadequate to respond to the exigencies
of an escape situation."

Id.

While the present case does not

involve an escape charge, the exigencies of the kidnapping and
assault by a prisoner charges also require an atypical review of
the duress defense.
In Tuttle. this Court determined that the trial court
was correct in applying a modified Lovercamp test in instructing
the jury and affirmed Tuttle's conviction.

Id. at 634-35. The

Lovercamp test approved in Tuttle states:
[W]e hold that the proper rule is that a
limited defense of necessity [or compulsion
or duress] is available if the following
conditions exist:
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific
threat of death, forcible sexual attack or
substantial bodily injury in the immediate
future;
(2) There is no time for a complaint to
the authorities or there exists a history of
futile complaints which make any result from
such complaints illusory;
-9-

(3) There is no time or opportunity to
resort to the courts;
(4) There is no evidence of force or
violence used towards prison personnel or
other "innocent" persons in the escape; and
(5) The prisoner immediately reports to
the proper authorities when he has attained a
position of safety from the immediate threat.
Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d at 831-32, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 115. The
Kansas Court of Appeals adopted and modified this test in State
v. Pichon, 15 Kan.App.2d 527, 811 P.2d 517, 522-23 (Kan.App.
1991) (listing jurisdictions which have or have not applied the
Lovercamp test).

The Kansas court modified the first paragraph

to read, "The prisoner is faced with a threat of imminent
infliction of death or great bodily harm," in order to comport
with the statutory compulsion defense in Kansas.

Ijd. at 523.

In a case factually similar to the present one, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the kidnapping
convictions of three co-defendants.

In State v. Little, 67 N.C.

App. 128, 312 S.E.2d 695 (N.C.App.), review denied, 311 N.C. 307,
317 S.E.2d 905 (1984), defendants had seized control of an area
of the prison in which they were incarcerated.

Using weapons,

they held guards and inmates hostage for nearly forty-eight
hours. J[d. at 696. As in the present case, defendants sought to
subpoena the records of the Department of Corrections; however,
the trial court quashed the subpoenas and ruled that duress could
not be raised as a defense in that case.

Ixi. at 697. Citing

North Carolina law, the court said "'[I]n order to constitute a
defense to a criminal charge other than taking the life of an
innocent person, the coercion or duress must be present,
-10-

Imminent

or impending,

and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded

apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not
done,'"

Id. at 698 (quoting State v. Kerns, 27 N.C.App. 354,

357, 219 S.E.2d 228, 230-31 (1975) (emphasis added in Little).
The court quoted the Lovercamp test, adopted in North Carolina in
State v. Watts, 60 N.C.App. 191, 298 S.E.2d 436 (1982), then
stated:
It is true that defendants' acts of
kidnapping and holding hostage prison
officials do not fit neatly into the scheme
of things envisioned by Watts* For example,
the fourth and fifth conditions set forth in
Watts fLovercamp1 are clearly inapplicable to
the facts of this case. We need not decide
if judicial surgery or alchemy is necessary
to transform conditions four and five into
useful requisites when inmates kidnap and
hold prison officials hostage because the
defendants, in this case, did not even
satisfy the first three conditions of Watts
rLovercamp].
Little^ 312 S.E.2d at 698. The court further held that there was
no error when the trial court quashed defendants' subpoenas.
When defendants sought a subpoena requiring
production of information about the existence
of weapons in certain cell blocks, prisoners'
assaults en other prisoners, and emotional
and psychiatric complaints of prisoners, all
with the apparent aim of showing "deplorable
conditions" at Central Prison as
justification for the three defendants taking
prison employees hostage, the trial court
held that "there is no law to allow the
defense of duress or coercion in this case on
this charge of kidnappingf•] • • . The trial
court correctly held on the facts of this
case that the general prison conditions at
Central Prison provided defendants with no
defense to the charge of kidnapping and
holding hostage prison officials and inmates.
Id. at 699 (emphasis in original).
-11-

The first condition of the Lovercamp test is that
"[t]he prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death,
forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the
immediate future."

This condition translates to "was coerced

• . . by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical
force upon him or a third person" in the Utah compulsion statute.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-302. As the Arizona Court of Appeals said
in State v. Lamar. 144 Ariz. 49()f 698 P.2d 735, (Ariz.App. 1984):
Duress envisions a third person compelling a
person by the threat of immediate physical
violence to commit a crime against another
person or the property of another person.
Id. 144 Ariz, at 497, 698 P.2d at 742. The Alaska Court of
Appeals in Betzner v. State, 768 P.2d 1150 (Alaska App. 1989)f
stated:
"Duress must consist of threatening conduct
which produces in the defendant a reasonable
fear of immediate or imminent death or
serious bodily harm. Threatened future death
or serious bodily harm does not suffice."
Id. at 1155 (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook of Criminal
Law § 49 (1972)).

See also United State v. Campbell, 609 F.2d

922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied. 445 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct.
1282 (1980) ("Basically a defense of duress or coercion requires
that there be an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm
which requires the defendant to commit the criminal act, and it
must be in a situation in which there was no opportunity to avoid
the danger").
Defendant in the present case, just as the defendants
in Little, has failed to meet the conditions set out in
-12-

Lovercamp.

The first condition, as modified to read the same as

the compulsion statute, is that defendant had to show that he was
coerced by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful
physical force upon him or a third person•

When proffering the

evidence supposedly to be gained from the Department of
Corrections officials, defendant said that his defense was one of
compulsion (T. at 13). He claimed that he had been incarcerated
"under rather incredible and strict scrutiny11 (T. at 14); he had
requested "relief from the physical and safety threats that ha[d]
been made against him during primarily the eight years since [his
last conviction]"; those threats were from other prisoners (T. at
15); certain witnesses could testify about their knowledge of
certain threats made against defendant, and the investigation and
disposition of defendant's complaints about those threats (T. at
17).

Defendant never alleged that there was "the use or

threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him or a
third person" at the time he committed the kidnapping and
assault.

Because there was no immediacy to the threats defendant

complained of, the trial court correctly determined that
defendant had not demonstrated that the defense of compulsion was
viable in his case.
Defendant has also failed to demonstrate that there was
no time for complaint to the authorities, although he did allege
that there was a history of futile complaints.

Giving him the

benefit of his allegation, he may have met the second condition
of the Lovercamp test.

However, he has not alleged that he meets
-13-

the third condition.

Defendant never alleged that he did not

have the time or opportunity to resort to the courts for
protection from the alleged threats. He alleged that he had been
receiving threats for eight years and had filed complaints about
the threats with prison officials during that time (T. at 15 and
17).

He felt that his complaints were not being handled

properly.

He never alleged that he had filed any court

proceeding to seek redress; neither has he alleged that he did
not have time to do so.

Defendant has not met the third

condition of the Lovercamp test,
This Court may find, as did the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, that conditions four and five do not apply in kidnapping
and assault by a prisoner cases; however, defendant has not met
all of the other conditions of the Lovercamp test, and
consequently, the compulsion statute.

Therefore, the trial court

was correct in concluding that the defense of compulsion was not
available to defendant in this case.

-14-

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling on the defense of
compulsion and affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/^~"day of November,

1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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Brooke C. Wells and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, Attorneys for Defendant, 424 East 500 South, Suite
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

; "5 " day of November,

1991.
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ADDENDUM

0>

IN THE OTSTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

31

* * * * *

1

4

1
51
61

7

81
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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 901900989 FS

vs.
KENNETH GLEN ROBERTS,
Defendant.
* * * * *

10

111
121

BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS

131

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

14

151

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

16
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January 17, 1991

18

FILE

191
20

JUN 1 2 1991
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22
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23
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Third Juoicia* District

25

JUN 1 1 1991
AulLAKECOy

NORA S. WORTHEN, CSR, RPR

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF*
GREGORY G. SKORDAS
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

FOR UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS:
LORENZO K. MILLER
General Counsel
6100 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84107

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
BROOKE C. WELLS
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc,
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

2
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JANUARY 17 f 1991; A.M. SESSION

21

THE COURT:

The matter before the Court Is State

3

of Utah versus Kenneth Glen Roberts.

4

that M r . Roberts is present here personally.

51

of witness's motions to quash subpoenas; is that right?

61

MR. MILLER:

7

THE COURTi

8I

This is some

That's correct.
Mr. Miller, you represent the

Department of Corrections?

91
10J

The record will show

MR. MILLER:

Yes, and also the people that have

been subpoenaed in the Department

111

THE COURT:

Fine.

121

MR. MILLER:

131

THE COURT:

141

MR. MILLER:

Do you want their names?
Yes, might as well.
First of all it was Gary DeLand, and

15

subsequent to h i s — t h e motion and receiving his subpoena we

161

received subpoenas for David Franchina, Jerry Cook, Nick

171

Morgan, Fred Trujillous, Robert Steele, John Glazier and

18

last night I just realized there is another one for Nola

191

Phillips.

201

have submitted but she is also included.

She is not represented in any of the papers I

211

THE COURT:

Okay*

221

MR. MILLER:

You can proceed, Mr. Miller.

I'd like to begin by stating first

231

of all that the Department of Corrections and its employees

24I

are not trying to harass or delay the defense in any of

251

these proceedings.

It is merely trying to get the defense
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II

and this Court and its officers to obey the rules of

21

criminal procedures as they have been stated in the

31

statute.

41

Basically our contentions in all of these motions

51

is that the subpoenas that w e r e issued t o the Department

61

w e r e improperly served in that they w e r e placed in the

71

h a n d s of people unauthorized to take personal service for

81

the person that is named.

9I

to quash those subpoenas and w e ask that the defense

Because of that, w e have moved

101

re-serve those in a correct m a n n e r — i n the m a n n e r that's

111

proper.

12

our ability, but w e also ask the Court m a k e them abide b y

131

the rules as established.

141

A g a i n w e are willing to cooperate to the best of

I'd like to also address M r . DeLand and a few of

151

the other people that have been subpoenaed.

161

a v e r y busy m a n .

171

days prior t o a trial.

181

informed, the arraignment started on June 15th of this

191

year.

201

several months and w e just received these subpoenas less

211

than eight days ago.

221

ago.

231

about that subpoena last night because of the process of

24

the m a i l within our department.

251

M r . DeLand is

H e is scheduled far in advance of seven
This trial, as I have been

It is n o w January 17th, there has been a lapse of

In fact it has only been several days

I k n o w Nola Phillips I m e n t i o n e d — I w a s just informed

Trial was originally set for September 24th,
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continued to November 26th, continued to January 22nd. The
defense has had plenty of time to serve proper subpoenas,
but yet they have decided that in the last moment before
trial they will serve subpoenas that greatly are—or put a
great burden on the Department and its employees.
As you've noticed, David Franchina, Jerry Cook
and Nick Morgan have also been served.

Both Gary DeLand

and David Franchina are the number one and two people in
the Department.

They are asking those people stand at this

trial doing nothing at work, not able to manage the
Department in the way that they are supposed to do that,
and that puts a great burden on them.
Tou will also notice that both David Franchina
and Gary DeLand have previously scheduled meetings. One,
Gary DeLand would be in southern Utah teaching a law course
for in-service training, and David Franchina is scheduled
to be at the legislative committee—Law Enforcement
Legislative Committee, and neither of those two meetings
can be rescheduled at this short notice, and those
schedules have been locked in for quite sometime.
Mr. Cook is the number one person at the
Institutional Operations and yet he has been subpoenaed on
short notice. Also, he has only received approximately
four working days under these.
THE COURT: When was he served?

5
nnirBTTmt»»

II

MR. MILLER:

21

MS. WELLS:

3

Yesterday.
Hick Morgan was served the 15th or

w a s it the 17th?

41

MR. MILLER:

51

THE COURT:

61

MR. MILLER:

All Monday.
Monday?

Okay.

So w e notice w e have got a three-day

71

weekend here.

So w e have g o t — i f it was served late Monday

81

he would have received it, if it was properly served, on

91

Monday, but it wasn't so it would take the mail for all of

10

these p e o p l e — t a k e s interoffice m a i l — t h e y wouldn't receive

111

that until Tuesday.

12

Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and that's it.

131

on the weekend, they are on a holiday.

14

on the morning of Tuesday.

151

is completely unreasonable that the defense has delayed

16

this m a n y months to subpoena these people and now ask that

171

this court make them attend this hearing with improper

181

service.

19

That gives them Tuesday afternoon,
Then they are

W e have got court

Under those circumstances, it

That's basically our contention.
One other contention is Nick Morgan is another

201

special case, in t h a t — a n d I guess Nola Phillips would also

211

b e the other one.

221

asked for documents.

231

working days to produce all the documents requested in

241

their subpoenas.

251

And again, we'll comply with these if w e can.

They have Subpoenas Duces Tecum, which
They are giving us less than four

They have had plenty of time for this.
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But four

1

day's notice is a very limited time to comply with these

2

subpoena requests and that's the Department's contention

3

and the individual officers. Thank you.

41
51

THE COURT: Do you want to add something, Mr.
Skordas?

6

MR. SKORDAS:

If I could, briefly, your Honor.

71

I think that more important than the fact that

8

the subpoenas may or may not have been served properly is

91

the essence of proposed testimony by these witnesses.

I am

101

wondering whether any of them have any relevance at all to

111

the case at hand.

121

is charged with an aggravated kidnapping, an aggravated

13

assault by a prisoner.

14

to be some sort of compulsion, as I understand it.

What we are looking at, Mr. Roberts here

I understand the defense is going

15

THE COURT:

Or justification.

16

MR. SKORDAS: Right.

In that he was compelled to

171

do this because of mistreatment by prison authorities and

18

other individuals.

191

I am wondering how many of these people can

20

really shed any light on that at all, or whether or not

211

what he is doing here is trying to upset the system, flush

221

out people, and really continue his kidnapping, his

23

original charge, by kidnapping these people, so to speak,

24I

and having them come into court and making this circus that

25

he has created much, much bigger than what it is—he has

rOMPlTPPP-^TriPn
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really intended to.
I don't thin}: under the rules or under the
constitution Mr. Roberts is entitled to bring in people
without any foundation, without any relevance to the case,
without any personal knowledge about the case just so that
he can put on his little circus act in front of a jury here
next week.

That would be my reason for asking the Court

not to force these people to come in and testify next
Tuesday.
I want to make clear that we are very interested
and pushing this case along and I would hope that Mr.
Miller's comments don't lead the Court to think that these
people need more time, and so maybe we ought to continue
this trial along.

That's certainly the last thing I would

want to do, and I would meet with their representatives
personally and hope that we could get the papers together,
if the Court is going to require them to testify, rather
than continue it, so their calendars could be worked out.
But I don't think they are necessary or even appropriate
witnesses anyway.
THE COURTi

Thank you.

Ms. Wells?
MS. WELLS: Thank you, your Honor.
Tour Honor, first and foremost, if this were a
civil case in which the defendant were a plaintiff and was

8
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1

attempting to bring in witnesses that might be

21

questionable, I think this court could look at that and

3

make a determination whether or not these people were

4

appropriate.

5

criminal case wherein the defendant—or Mr. Roberts is the

61

defendant—a criminal defendant charged with two first

71

degree felony offenses—and although the State is the

81

prosecuting agency through Mr. Skordas, the complainant in

9

the case is the Department of Corrections—it is one of

But that's not what this is. This is a

101

their officers who is the alleged victim in this matter and

111

they provide the pool of person with whom witnesses for

12

that very event come.

13

Now, I'd like to address each of Mr. Miller's

141

concerns in the following way.

15

insufficient or improper service made within a required

16

time limit.

17

subpoenas indicate that they must be served within 24

18

hours.

19 J

He indicates that this was

The rules offering or governing issuance of

Tour Honor, clearly one week before is a

201

sufficient time within which to have those subpoenas

2l|

served.

22

With regard to the manner of their service—

231

THE COURTS

24
25

Just a moment. Would you get—there

is a paperback volume that says Utah Rules.
MS. WELLSi

It would be Volume 4.
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It is in the—

1

THE COURT:

2

it in Rule 4—what page, then?

3

Criminal Procedure?

4
5

MS. WELLS:
of subpoenas.

Is it in Volume 4?

I can never find

What rules?

Utah Rules of

I don't think that governs the issue

I think that is probably in the civil cases.

6

THE COURT: Let's find out what it says here.

7

MR. KILLER:

8

MR. SKORDAS:

9

MR. MILLER:

10
11

Look at Rule 14.
14. Look at Rule 14.
14(C).

MR. SKORDAS: Of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

12

THE COURT: Rule 14?

13

MR. SKORDAS:

14

MR. SKORDAS: Actually, your Honor, Utah Rules of

15

Criminal Procedure are no longer part of the Criminal Code.

16
17

MS. WELLS:

The rules are there.

They are in a

different place.

18
19

(b) and (c).

THE COURT:

I am in the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

20

MR. SKORDAS: After that.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. SKORDAS: Yes. Go to page 524.

23

MS. WELLS:

24
25

It is after that?

It is 523 or 24?

It is 24?

That's

right.
THE COURT: Okay.

5—oh, all right, now, Rule

10
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what?

14, did you say?
MS. WELLS:

It is Rule 14, your Honor. As I look

at the rule in this manner, there is no time line stated
governing the nature upon which the service is required.
TOE COURT: Okay.
MS. WELLS: My understanding has always been a
24-hour period is necessary and required.

Clearly that has

been met.
Now, your Honor, with regard to the manner in
which the subpoenas were served, this court is certainly
aware that the Department of Corrections personnel are in a
secure type of setting.

Those persons that are at the

prison are personally unaccessable to any type of process
server.
Further, by analogy, I would indicate that the
State, when it issues its subpoenas, does to police
officers and corrections officials in the very exact manner
in which service was effected by my representatives on
behalf of the defendant.
The Court must look at the particulars
involving—the people involved to determine whether or not
personal service is in any way available to us or if it is
able to be achieved.
THE COURT: Well, the rule—the very rule you
cited me to says, "Service shall be made by delivering a

11
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1

copy of the subpoena to the witness or interpreter

21

personally*"

3I

then you're talking, let's take a look beyond the rule and

41

see if this is really a reasonable thing on the other hand.

51

You are relying on the rule for one thing,

MS. WELLS:

Tour Honor, I would suggest to you

61

that if w e were required to serve each of these persons

71

personally, then no subpoenas issued for witnesses within

8]

this district are ever properly served.

9

in exactly the same manner.

Police are served

The State serves its subpoenas

101

to all persons either b y mail or by delivery to a

111

receptionist, someone who can take those and deliver them.

121

These persons are appearing in their capacity as officials

131

of the Department of Corrections, therefore, this is the

14I

only meaningful type of service and it is consistent with

15]

the rule.

161

If I could go on further though, and indicate to

171

the Court or address some of the other issues.

I don't

181

think M r . Miller is very familiar w i t h the goings on of

191

this case, since it was filed by the State some six or

201

seven months ago.

21I

these subpoenas.

221

has held in chambers with M r . Skordas and I, which have

231

necessitated two continuances of this case, it is because

241

w e have been in negotiation with the Department of

25I

Corrections•

He points out w e are late in issuing
The Court knows through conversations it

12
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In one instance, Mr. Morgan, one of the very
people who is subpoenaed here, for other reasons, kept us
waiting for a period of six weeks without responding to us
concerning his discussion with Mr* DeLand and other people.
Pursuant to properly filed discovery motions, we have
attempted to get each and all—each and every document and
all documents pertaining to Mr. Robert's custody status and
incarceration records through Carrie Hill, another attorney
with the Department of Corrections, and to this date have
not received that information.

Therefore it is necessary

to require, by subpoena, those very documents.
Now, with regard to why these particular persons
are necessary, your Honor, I have been representing Mr.
Roberts since this matter was filed.

I have had the

opportunity to review a voluminous amount of information.
I have, with him, determined that his defense to this
alleged crime is one of compulsion which is authorized as a
legal defense under the criminal code.
the very definition of that.

I can cite you to

It is contained in 76-2-302.

It indicates that, "A person is not guilty of an offense
when he engaged in proscribed conduct because he was
coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent use of
unlawful physical powers."
THE COURT:

76-2 what.

MS. WELLS:

76-2-302. It is the first—well, it

13

Is the second delineated defense to criminal responsibility
Included within the code.
Now, Mr. Roberts' situation is rather unique in
that he is not an ordinary citizen but is confined to the
Utah State Prison. As this court has been aware, Mr.
Roberts, while on parole status, was involved in the—or
was criminally responsible for the injuries that were
caused to a young lady, Miss LaDawn Prue. As a result of
that incident in 1982, additional charges were filed
against him and he has been incarcerated since that time.
As a result of that peirticular incident, which involved Mr.
Roberts' actions, which occurred as a result of Parole
Board actions, which ultimately led to suit against the
Utah State Prison, and those persons individually for
malfeasance or acts in allowing his release, several of
those Department of Corrections persons lost their jobs and
as a result of that, Mr. Roberts has continued his
incarceration under rather incredible and strict scrutiny
because as a result of his actions there were personal
actions taken against members of Department of Corrections.
Since 1982, particularly, your Honor, I have
reviewed the documents over eight years of incarceration
which involve individually each of these persons who have
been subpoenaed.

Granted it is not now in their—perhaps

in their present capacity, but their knowledge of this case

14
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

1

involves actions or attempts by Mr. Roberts to secure some

21

type of relief from the physical and safety threats that

3

have been made against him during primarily the eight years

4

since this occurred.

51

who have been subpoenaed have direct involvement in them.

61

As I say, perhaps not now in their present capacity, with

71

regard to Mr. DeLand.

81

THE COURTx

9I

by other prisoners?

101

MS. WELLS:

In each of the instances the people

When you say safety threats, you mean

Other prisoners.

I intend to

11]

introduced a series of documents known as grievances in

121

which Mr. Roberts, over that eight-year period, explained

13

through the appropriate channels that his safety was in

14

jeopardy, that threats were being made against him.

15

all goes to his state of mind and certainly is relevant to

161

the defense of compulsion.

17

That

Now, as I indicated, Mr. Franchina was a warden

18I

and the head of policies.

Mr. Glazier is one of those

191

persons who acted as representative of the Inspector

201

General in denying requests and grievances that were raised

211

by Mr. Roberts.

221

involved since his assuming the position of Inspector

23

General, directly involved in the case at hand in that he

24I

and representatives of his offices responded and were

251

involved in the investigation of this particular offense to

Nick Morgan has also been

personally

15
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1

which he is charged.

21

has been involved not only in these attempted negotiations

31

over the past seven months, but it was—and we have tapes

41

that will show that Mr. Roberts at the time—that he was

5

involved with the Utah State Prison guard, asked to speak

61

to Mr. DeLand directly.

7

Mr. DeLand, despite his affidavit,

It was only when he was informed that Mr. DeLand

81

had been contacted and would be involving himself in the

91

investigation, that this incident resolved itself and I

10J

would add without injury to any person.

Mr. DeLand—and I

111

have seen the corresponsence—has responded personally by

121

corresponsence to Mr. Roberts, therefore, each of these

131

persons—I can go on.

141

person's involvement if you wish me to do so.

I can tell you the relevance of each

15J

THE COURT:

I do, go ahead.

16I

MS. WELLS: With regard to Gary DeLand, I just

17

indicated I do not intend to call him for any purpose of

181

dealing with him about these current negotiations, but

19

rather I intend to call him to testify concerning his

201

knowledge of the particular incident and his response

211

thereto, which involved his sending personal correspondence

221

to Mr. Roberts. Therefore he—and he is a critical,

23

critical witness for that very reason.

24
251

Mr. Morgan, as I have indicated to you, is now
the Inspector General. He has been issued a Subpoena Duces

16
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Tecum because t h e investigation of this m a t t e r w a s

21

ultimately turned over t o t h e Inspector General's office,

31

and additionally, persons including M r . Glazier and M s .

4I

P h i l l i p s , a s administrative hearing officers, w e r e directly

5

involved i n t h e hearing of M r . R o b e r t s ' grievances and

61

t h e i r subsequent d e n i a l .

71

So that addresses N i c k Morgan.

N o l a Phillips and John G l a z i e r — h e also mentioned

81

Jerry C o o k a n d David F r a n c h i n a — b o t h of those individuals

91

w e r e previously wardens over t h e particular units that M r .

10

Roberts w a s housed at and have personal knowledge of t h e

111

eight-year period of time that M r . Roberts spent p r i o r t o

121

this incident and c a n testify concerning their knowledge of

13

threats m a d e against him, subsequent investigations of that

14

and subsequent disposition thereto.

15|

that have been mentioned b y M r . M i l l e r .

16

Those a r e t h e ones

I would also indicate that there is n o affidavit

171

dealing w i t h M s . Phillips and so I think that it is not

18

p r o p e r that h e address a n y quashable subpoena b y her, since

191

there is n o affidavit before y o u here o n h e r behalf.

201

T H E COURTS

W e l l , w h y would y o u w a n t t o call her?

21I

M S . WELLSx

She is a hearing officer, y o u r Honor.

22

S h e h a s b e e n directly involved in t h e denial a n d t h e

23I

disposition of at least five o r s i x separate grievance

241

forms indicating threats of force and physical safety that

251

have b e e n filed through appropriate channels b y M r .

17
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Roberts.

21

Mr. Glazier in that they were both responsible for

31

disposition of those forms.

41

Ms. Phillips is in the same position basically as

Tour Honor, if the Court wishes us to, if the

5I

Court is prepared to say these were not properly served,

61

then I would indicate to you that in whatever manner we

71

can, we will properly serve them.

81

will send somebody out there to do it today.

91

appears that these people are all on notice.

10I

If we have to do that, I
But it

The purpose of a subpoena is to give them

11I

appropriate and proper notice of their necessity to appear

121

as a witness.

13I

this point on behalf of these people who indicated no good

141

reason why they should not be required to testify, and deny

151

this man his right to a fair and constitutionally protected

161

trial, should otherwise have the benefit of saying that you

171

did not personally serve me, although we know we got these

18I

and we are on notice as to what it is.

191

be a manner in which justice would be granted and I suggest

201

to you again that is the manner in which all subpoenas are

21I

served by the State because of the practical problems

221

involved with serving people involved in law enforcement

231

agencies.

24I

law enforcement albeit through the Department of

25I

Corrections*

I see no practical reason why we should, at

That seems to me to

And each of these persons are associated with

Again I reiterate the reason these went out

18
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1

seven days prior to trial rather than months before is

21

because of the Department of Corrections' refusal to deal

31

with us in a timely manner.

4

Morgan will certainly remember, we waited six weeks for his

51

last response which netted the court's continuing upon our

6I

request of this matter.

7

negotiate with the Department of Corrections until last

8

week.

And that I did note and Mr.

And in fact, we have attempted to

9

Mr. Skordas would agree we have been in contact

10

about that and it was only on probably Friday—in fact, I

111

think Mr. DeLand was served on Friday—Thursday or Friday

12

of this week, so his service would have been sooner—but it

13

was only because of their indications that they would talk

14

to us, but then their refusal to give us any answers that

151

we have been forced at this time to say, all right, looks

16

like the trial is on.

We must go forward.

17

THE COURT:

Thank you.

18

Well, I'm going the quash the subpoenas.

First

19

of all, I do think the rule—it does say personal service

201

and that's what it says, and so based upon that there is no

211

personal service.

221

service of process will be quashed.

231

The service of process—attempted

Secondly, I do think the amount of time was

24

unreasonable.

Under the circumstances, I know these

25

are busy people and that doesn't justify not coming to

19
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lj

court, even though it doesn't matter how important you are,

2j

President Nixon has to go testify if he has got evidence to

31

be p r e s e n t e d — b u t under the circumstances where this trial

41

date has been set for some weeks, I think waiting until the

51

last minute to serve the subpoenas is unreasonable.

61

not enough notice.

71

That's

But more fundamentally than that, I am inclined

81

to agree with M r . Skordas' position on relevance of this

91

testimony.

I don't think the defense of compulsion is a

101

viable defense as a matter of law in this case.

111

think the law is if you are being mistreated at the prison

12|

you are therefore justified in taking a hostage.

131

just not the law.

141

where someone is threatened.

151

crime, if you don't wait for me in the get-away car, then I

16I

will shoot you, that kind of compulsion.

17

compulsion we are talking about here.

181

testimony of these witnesses would be irrelevant.

191

defense is not available as a matter of law and I am not

201

going to let you put on that evidence.

211

I don't

That's

This statute was made for a situation
If you don't commit this

Not the kind of

I think the
That

I am j u s t — e v e n if you wanted to reserve them, I

221

am just not going to make this a trial of the Department of

231

Corrections.

24|

the crime or didn't he, and the subpoenas will be quashed.

251

The issue here is going to be did he commit

M S . WELLS:

Tour Honor, based upon that I would

20
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move to continue this trial*

2I

entire defense.

31

defense that I have for months indicated, not only to the

41

State but to the Court, that I intended t o — i n t e n d to do.

51

And I move for a continuance and I would intend to file

61

some sort of interlocutory appeal of this court's decision

71

on that matter.

81

cannot go forward on Tuesday, to attempt to try this matter

91

with the Court having now told m e that I cannot present the

10J
Ill
121
13
141

The Court has now undercut my

You have told m e that I cannot present the

But under any circumstances, your Honor, I

defense intended.
THE COURT:

Well, your client is entitled a

speedy trial.
M S . WELLS:

He has waived it before.

I am

certain he will waive that again.

15

THE COURT:

Will you?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

All right.

If you want to file an

18

interlocutory appeal that might be the better way to do it

19

if that's y o u r —

20

M S . WELLS:

Well, I am also requesting a

21I

continuance in order to do that.

I am in a position where

22

I need to do that.

231

manner, but I cannot do that at the same time as being

241

concerned about beginning a trial on Tuesday with no

251

defense and no witnesses.

I will certainly do that in a timely

21

THE COURT: Motion for a continuance is granted.
Order that this case's trial date will be stricken. What
do you want to do, set another trial date?
MS. WELLS: Well, perhaps—I don't know.

I am

trying to think.
THE COURT:

I will give you a couple of days to

think about and that get back to me.
MS. WELLS: All right.
THE COURT: Court will be in recess.
(Proceedings concluded.)
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